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Abstract
We utilise a unique matched teacher-school data set of absenteeism
records to quantify the impact of group interaction on the absence be-
haviour of primary and secondary teachers. To address problems of iden-
tication our study focuses on teachers who move between schools. The
estimates for movers suggest that absenteeism is inuenced by prevail-
ing group absence behaviour at the school. Our ndings suggest that a
worker takes one more day of absenteeism if his average coworker takes
12 more days or 8 more days absenteeism per quarter for primary school
and secondary school teachers, respectively. We interpret this as evidence
that worker shirking is inuenced by workplace absence norms.
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1 Introduction
Absenteeism is viewed as costly and disruptive for organisations. For instance,
Barmby et al (2002) demonstrate for nine industrialised countries that a sig-
nicant proportion of work hours are lost through absence, ranging from 1.8%
to 6% of average weekly hours for Switzerland and Sweden, respectively. As
we note later, gures for the teaching profession fall within this range. Teacher
absence incurs direct costs through the organisation and payment of cover for
absent teachers. In addition, there are indirect costs in terms of adverse e¤ects
on other sta¤ and potentially on student performance (Ehrenberg et al 1986).
In contrast, psychologists have suggested that absenteeism in stressful situations
might be implicitly condoned by management because it is seen as a form of
temporary relief for the employee, and could therefore be regarded as an e¢ cient
response (Steers and Rhodes 1978).
Devising an appropriate policy response to absenteeism is therefore complex,
even more so when it is realised that worker absence can occur involuntarily be-
cause of physical or mental ill-health, or because of voluntary shirking behaviour
by workers (Barmby et al 1994, Johansson and Palme 2002). A recent report
by the Western Australian Government conjectures that up to 50% of absence
amongst public sector workers, including teachers, is in fact voluntary, which
implies a substantial degree of shirking (Auditor General 1997).1 Disentan-
gling shirking behaviour (i.e. voluntary absence) from involuntary absence is
1 Imants and van Zoelen (1995) suggested that only 20% of teacher absence could be directly
related to what they described as justiable medical grounds.
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extremely di¢ cult to do in practice. Previous research has attempted to do so
using absence spell length. However, as Driver and Watson (1989) argue this is
unreliable because long spells of absence could be voluntary and a sequence of
short spells could be indicative of recurring sickness.
Consequently, this paper does not explicitly try to distinguish between vol-
untary and involuntary absence. Instead, we take the approach of looking for
peer, or group interaction, e¤ects on individual absence behaviour, and also in-
vestigate the existence of multiple equilibria in this relationship. A signicant
positive association between individual and group behaviour in relation to ab-
senteeism rates increases the likelihood that we are observing shirking behaviour
rather than simply sickness. There are, however, serious identication problems
when trying to establish whether group behaviour a¤ects individual behaviour,
which we discuss below, and to mitigate this problem our paper focuses atten-
tion on teachers who move between schools. In addition, we also assess the
e¤ects of endogeneity bias amongst movers by distinguishing between moves for
promotion and other moves.
We use a unique and previously unused database of matched teachers and
schools obtained from the Queensland government of Australia. Using this data
we estimate cross-sectional and panel xed e¤ect models for the full sample as
well as models for teachers who move schools. The results of cross-sectional
models of absenteeism, though purely descriptive, are also reported to help
ll the gap in the empirical literature on the correlates of absenteeism in the
teaching profession and more generally within the public sector. The estimates
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for movers suggest that absenteeism is inuenced by prevailing group absence
behaviour at the school. Our ndings suggest that a worker takes one more
day of absenteeism if his average coworker takes 12 more days or 8 more days
absenteeism per quarter for primary school and secondary school teachers, re-
spectively. We are unable to nd evidence of multiple equilibria, which at the
simplest level would be reected by a bimodal distribution of absence rates at
the school level. Figure 1 shows that a bimodal distribution of absence rates is
not observed for our population of schools, and we are unable to detect multi-
ple equilibria in our statistical analysis. Teachers on temporary contracts have
absenteeism rates 22%-24% lower than permanent teachers, which is consistent
with earlier evidence on contract status e¤ects in the private sector (Ichino and
Riphahn 2005).
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 contains a review of
relevant literature, including a discussion of the notion of a sick school. Section 3
provides a detailed description of the data that are used in the empirical analysis.
In section 4 we provide a theoretical framework and econometric methodology
for the empirical work, which is followed by a discussion of the results in section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
A sizeable literature exists with regard to the inuence of group interaction ef-
fects on a range of social and economic outcomes, such as crime, educational
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achievement, employment and ethnic skill di¤erences (Case and Katz 1991,
Borjas 1995, Glaeser et al 1996, Aaronson 1998, Sacerdote 2001, Marmaros and
Sacerdote 2002, Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005). Of particular relevance to
the current study is Ichino and Maggi (2000) who found evidence of signicant
group interaction e¤ects on individual shirking behaviour within a large Italian
bank.
In the education literature, there have been many qualitative case studies of
the factors inuencing teacher absenteeism (Eisenberg et al 1986, Dworkin et
al 1990, Imants and van Zoelen 1995), but little statistical analysis. Imants and
van Zoelen (1995) argued that it was worthwhile classifying schools in terms
of those that are healthy and those that are sick. Specically, they found that
collegial sta¤ relationships and a supportive management style from the school
principal reduced the rate of teacher absence. Furthermore, a recent report for
Australia concluded that motivation and commitment appear to be important
elements which restrict absence through sickness, giving rise to a need for ab-
sent management programmes that take account of the importance of schools
leaders in promoting healthy work environments (Department of Education,
Science and Training 2001).
The only previous econometric analysis of teacher absenteeism is Ehrenberg
et al (1986), who focused on providing an explanation of the di¤erences in aver-
age rates of teacher absenteeism between school districts because of di¤erences
in sick pay provisions. Average absenteeism was positively associated with the
use of sick banks, whereby teachers accumulate unused sick leave, and negatively
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related to buy-back provisions that allowed unused sick leave to be cashed in.
There was also some evidence to suggest that a larger fraction of teachers aged
over 55 reduced sick leave usage. Of the variables controlling for school en-
vironment, the proportion of students living in an urban area and the ethnic
composition of the student body were statistically insignicant but the average
level of student absenteeism was positively correlated with teacher absenteeism,
which implies that the e¤ect of group behaviour on individual behaviour may
extend beyond the inuence of ones colleagues.
More generally, previous research on absenteeism conducted by economists
has focused mainly on the private sector and investigated the impact of both
individual (supply side) and workplace (demand side) characteristics (Delgado
and Kniesner 1997, Barmby and Stephan 2000). Demand side factors that have
been discussed in the literature include rm size (Coles and Treble 1996). It is
shown that larger rms have higher rates of absenteeism, which arises because of
their ability to diversify the risk from absence more easily (Barmby and Stephan
2000). Clearly, the same could apply in a school environment. Supply-side
factors, such as age and gender, have been investigated using aggregate data by
Paringer (1983) and Bridges and Mumford (2001). Both studies found that older
and single workers were more likely to be absent, especially for men. However,
Delgado and Kniesner (1997) found the opposite e¤ects in a microeconomic
study of London bus drivers.
The inuence of the workers contract status on absenteeism has also been
investigated by Arai and Thoursie (2005) and others. For instance, Barmby et
6
al (1995) and Barmby (2002) show that full time workers, or those with longer
contracted hours, are more likely to be absent when compared to part time
workers. Similarly, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) show that absence rates increase
once a probationary period ends and employment protection legislation comes
into e¤ect.
3 Data
This study uses personnel records obtained from Education Queenslands human
resource information system, and refer to the calendar and school years of 2001
and 2002 for all teachers employed in the state school system. The absenteeism
data is recorded under a number of categories: family/paternity leave, work
injury leave that is covered by employee insurance, time o¤ due to industrial
disputes, and absence due to reasons of self-reported illness. The absence days
are recorded as the cumulative number of days per quarter. Our data tracks the
individual teachers throughout the time period, thereby enabling us to construct
a panel data set of teacher absenteeism. We focus on absence due to reported
illness. Teachers can take up to two weeks sick leave per year. They can
accumulate unused sick leave in a sick bank, which is transferrable between
schools. There is no limit on how much leave can be accumulated, but unlike
some school districts in the US, there are no buy-back provisions for unused sick
leave.
In common with previous studies, we restrict our analysis to teachers who
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were employed throughout the two years, to remove possible bias related to the
probationary teaching period and those teachers in the process of leaving the
profession.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of teachers absence. The gures are mean
values for the percentage of working time lost and percentage of teachers taking
absence. Figures for the UK from Bowers and McIver (2000) are presented for
comparison. It is interesting that although full-time teachers in Australia are
more likely to take absence, the average percentage of time lost through absence
is similar in the UK and Australia.
For each teacher we have information on personal characteristics, such as age,
gender, whether a worker has a disability, their length of tenure in the public
sector and ethnic background; the latter is comprised of two groups, teachers
from a Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) and other Australians.2 We
also have data on the workplace characteristics of teachers, drawn from another
source of school administrative data. From this we can determine the school
the teacher was working at, and along with occupational codes allows us to
distinguish between primary and secondary school teachers and the size of the
school.
Queensland teachers can be employed under three types of contracts - ca-
sual, permanent or temporary. Casual teachers are generally short-term contract
sta¤, usually reliefteachers, who may enter and leave the teaching workforce on
a regular basis. Consequently, we exclude this group from our analysis. Tempo-
2Some teachers are indigenous Australians, however they represent a very small proportion
of the teaching workforce and provide insu¢ cient observations for statistical analysis.
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rary teachers are employed on xed term contracts, generally of one years length,
which can be renewed, whereas permanent teachers are in e¤ect tenured. Addi-
tionally, teachers can be employed on a full-time or part-time basis. Unlike US
school systems where there can be considerable variation in employment terms
and conditions across school districts (Ehrenberg et al 1986), all Queensland
teachers operate under the same basic pay and working conditions.
Measures of school quality are constructed from student record data that
refer to all students in the Queensland state school system in 2001. For primary
school students we have records for all year 7 students (the nal year of primary
school) and matching year 5 records (for 1999). For secondary students we have
all year 10 student records (the nal compulsory year of high school) and year
12 records for those pupils who remain in education. The student dataset also
provides information on student test score performance. In our data we have
test scores for year 7 (with matching year 5 scores) and standardized year 12
test scores. The individual pupil test scores are averaged for each school to
provide an indicator of school quality. However, for secondary schools, year 12
test scores will not necessarily be an accurate representation of overall student
quality. This is because: (a) poorer quality or less motivated students are likely
to leave the school after the end of compulsory schooling (year 10); and (b)
some students may choose to move to more successful schools to complete their
high school. To allow for this our measure of secondary school quality utilises
school retention data, which refers to the proportion of students who began at
the school in year 7 and also completed at the same school in year 12.
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Queensland covers a large area of land and geographically remote areas have
higher concentrations of indigenous Australians who are, in educational and
socio-economic terms, generally amongst the most disadvantaged individuals
(Bradley et al 2005). Other schools are in regional centres and then there is
the urban concentration of population in south east Queensland centred around
Brisbane. As we have the postcode for each school, this enables us to identify
urban, rural and remote schools.
In Table 2 we present summary statistics on variables used in the empirical
analysis separately for primary and secondary schools. It is clear that women
dominate primary school teaching by a ratio of 5 to 1, whereas the gender
disparity is much lower in secondary school teaching. Other covariates show
little variation between primary and secondary schools. Three quarters of all
secondary school teachers are non-specialists, the omitted case.3 Mean absen-
teeism rates are very similar for primary and secondary school teachers. Figure
2 displays the distribution of individual absence days. A large of proportion of
teachers took less than 5 days absence over the 2 year period. At the same time,
there is a clear tail at the right hand side of the distribution.
3The qualications required to be a teacher in Australia di¤er between primary and sec-
ondary school sectors. Secondary school teachers generally complete an undergraduate course
followed by a graduate diploma in education. Conversely, primary school teaching involves an
undergraduate course dedicated to primary school education. As a result subject specialization
and post-graduate study information is only available for secondary school teachers
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4 Theoretical and econometric framework
To analyse these data we draw upon the theoretical framework and econometric
methodology developed by Ichino and Maggi (2000) in their study of absenteeism
amongst the employees of an Italian bank. They suggest four broad determi-
nants of individual variations in absenteeism. First, individual backgrounds,
including personal characteristics, which in the present context also includes
the contract status of the teacher. Second, the characteristics of the school in
which the teacher works and the locality in which they live, for instance, the
size of the school and the local unemployment rate, which are labelled locality
e¤ects. These factors are what Manski (1995) refers to as contextual e¤ects,
and exogenous changes in them have no multiplied e¤ect on teacher behaviour.
Third, teachers may be sorted between schools which have di¤erent average ab-
senteeism rates, which is linked to a fourth inuence, that of group interaction.
In this case, absenteeism of an individual teacher is inuenced by the prevalence
of that behaviour in the group (Manski 1993, Manski 1995), which gives rise
to the idea of a social multiplier e¤ect. Ichino and Maggi (2000) suggest that
the social multiplier could arise in the shirking context via (i) a peer monitor-
ing mechanism, that is, if more teachers shirk then an individual shirker is less
likely to be reported thus the penalty is lower and hence shirking is higher; (ii)
stigma e¤ects, whereby shirking represents acceptablebehaviour; and (iii) if
the school management has limited monitoring resources then the likelihood of
being caught shirking is reduced.
In view of these considerations, it is suggested that workers will compare
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the benets of shirking with the costs of shirking to maximise expected utility
(EU), as represented by Equation 1.
EUit = B(Ait; St; i)  C(Ait;
_
At) (1)
where Ait is the individual teachers chosen level of absence in period t, St
is a set of school and locality factors, and i represents the teachers preference
for absenteeism.
_
At is the average absenteeism level of the school in period
t, excluding the ith individual.4 The marginal penalty to absenteeism is lower
for higher values of
_
At for the reasons highlighted above. It follows that a
teachers propensity to absent themselves will be determined by the factors
listed in Equation 2.
Ait = g(
_
At; St; i) (2)
From the assumptions above it follows that @Ait=@
_
At > 0 and @Ait=@i > 0.
Chatterji and Tilley (2002) introduce the concept of the presenter, these are
workers with a low preference for absenteeism. Such workers derive satisfaction
from being able to maintain a presence at work, regardless of illness, or see it
is in their own best interest to carry out their duties. The teachers concern
for her class or the excess workload on colleagues, or perhaps their reputation
with the school management, counterbalances the decrease in utility from illness
or stress. Moreover, extra leisure time generates no increase in utility for this
type of individual, and thus the presenter is likely to have a low value of . We
4Throughout the empirical implementation t refers to a quarter.
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cannot observe  directly, however, it is likely that the preference for absenteeism
is highly correlated with the personal characteristics of the teacher. Also, for
workers on a temporary contract C(Ait) is likely to be higher as they face an
increased likelihood of contract non-renewal if their absenteeism rate is judged
to be unsatisfactory.
The rst model that we estimate is therefore given by Equation 3. Initially,
we ignore the time dimension in our data and simply estimate a cross-sectional
model.
Ai = Pi + 
_
A+ S +  (3)
Pi is a vector of individual background characteristics. In a subsequent
model we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and redene (3) as a panel
data model with individual specic xed e¤ects:





&jDjt + St + t (4)
where  is an individual specic xed e¤ect, Djt is a dummy variable to cap-
ture unobserved locality e¤ects where there are d localities or districts. Ideally
this variable would identify the school that a teacher was in at time t. However,
as our focus is on teachers who move schools and the fact that there are insu¢ -
cient teachers who movers to identify all 1123 school xed e¤ects, we therefore
adopt a similar approach to Ichino and Maggi (2000) by including xed e¤ects
for the 33 education districts. We argue that as education districts are rea-
sonably homogenous with respect to pay and policies these should adequately
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capture the e¤ect of time invariant local characteristics. Finally, tPi is simply
a time dummy interacted with ostensibly xed individual background variables
to control for time varying e¤ects from observed individual characteristics.
There are two further issues that must be considered. First, because group
interaction e¤ects are endogenous, estimates of
_
At may well be biased or even
spurious. One source of endogeneity bias is the so-called reection problem
whereby average group behaviour a¤ects individual behaviour but each indi-
vidual teachers behaviour also a¤ects average behaviour, which means that
individual errors are correlated and hence our estimates will be biased. An-
other source of endogeneity bias arises if relevant school covariates are omitted,
in which case the errors for teachers in the same school will be correlated and
thus the e¤ect of
_
At will again be biased. Spurious e¤ects arise where teach-
ers behave in a similar way because they share a common set of unobservable
characteristics which causes teachers to sort between schools.
In short, there is an identication problem, which we mitigate by investigat-
ing the e¤ect of group interaction for the subset of teachers who move schools.5










5Previous research has demonstrated that teachers move schools for both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary reasons (Hanushek et al 2004, Bonesronning et al 2005).
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where j refers to the origin school and k the destination school; Dkt Djt 1
is an indicator that a teacher moved education district. The advantage of this
approach is that we can explicitly control for individual xed e¤ects which is
important if there is sorting of individuals with similar preferences for absence
across the school system.6
Analysing only those teachers who move schools does not, however, solve
the reection problem completely. There still exists the possibility of several
sources of bias, which are identied by Ichino and Maggi (2000). First, the
stayersmean shirking level may be endogenous because group interaction e¤ects




Ajt 1 may also be
biased due to unobserved locality e¤ects which inuence both mover and stayer





Akt 1 (referred to as test 1). Third, there still remains the
possibility of measurement error, which downwardly biases our estimate of the
group interaction e¤ect. An alternative approach which may reduce all three




Akt 1 as the instrument, on the
assumption that this will directly a¤ect stayerscurrent behaviour but not the
movers current behaviour (test 2). A further way of investigating the potential
problems of endogenous stayer behaviour and the e¤ect of unobservable local
e¤ects is to investigate whether the behaviour of the stayers is a¤ected by the
6We checked whether there is seasonality in absence rates for teachers who move. There
are variations in the timing of movement and of absence levels. More movement occurs at the
end of the school year, however, omitting this quarter from our analysis has little e¤ect on
our results. Further absence levels do not appear to be seasonal in our data: the last quarter
of the year, for instance, has both the highest absence rate (year 1) and the lowest absence
rate (year 2).
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departure of bad workers (i.e. those with high absence rates) and the arrival of
good workers (i.e. those with low absence rates). This involves regressing the
change in the mean absence rate of stayers on a set of control variables, as well
as the mean absence rate of newly arrived teachers, which is expected to have a
positive e¤ect, and the mean absence rate of those teachers who depart, which is
expected to be negative.7 There still remains a potential bias, however, due to
the endogeneity of the mean absence rates of arriving and departing teachers,
which we seek to resolve by using the lagged mean absence rate of arriving
teachers and the lead mean absence rate of departing teachers (test 3).
5 Results
Tables 3 and 4 report estimates of Equation 3 for primary teachers and sec-
ondary teachers, respectively. Our dependant variable is days absent during
each quarter for each teacher. Initially we estimate Equation 3 by OLS. How-
ever, the record of teacher absenteeism in our data is a count of events, therefore
estimation using a count data approach (Poisson model) is also used for com-
parison with the OLS estimates.
We report the incident rate ratio (IRR) for the Poisson model for ease of
interpretation. Thus, an IRR greater than one indicates that the expected count
in the exposed group is greater than the expected count in the unexposed group.
For instance an IRR of 1.15 indicates a 15% increase in the absenteeism rate for
7This is equation 7 in Ichino and Maggi (2000).
16
the exposed group, whilst 0.85 indicates a 15% decrease in the rate. Since there
is a lack of detailed econometric evidence on the determinants of absenteeism
amongst teachers, we rst discuss the impact of individual background and
locality factors before we move to the main focus of the paper, the estimation
of group interaction e¤ects. In these models we report estimates of the impact
of school level absenteeism, however for the reasons noted above these estimates
should be treated as descriptive.
5.1 The e¤ect of personal and locality characteristics on
absenteeism
The OLS results in Tables 3 and 4 show that there is a non-linear relationship
between age and absenteeism which declines quite sharply for primary and sec-
ondary teachers but with slightly di¤erent turning points. For primary school
teachers the turning point is around the age of 30 whereas for secondary school
teachers it is age 28, after which absenteeism increases. We also estimated a
Poisson model where the age variable was grouped into bands to investigate the
non-linear relationship in more detail. The ndings (not reported) show that for
primary and secondary school teachers there is a substantial increase in absen-
teeism for older age groups. For instance, secondary school teachers aged 31-40
have a 9% increase in absenteeism rates compared to younger teachers (30 years
or younger) whereas workers aged 61 or more have a 61% greater absenteeism
rate, a di¤erential of 52 percentage points. Similarly, the di¤erential between
primary school teachers aged 31-40 and those aged 61 or more is 41 percent-
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age points. This is consistent with the age e¤ects found in aggregate evidence
(Bridges and Mumford 2001). These ndings could be partly to do with the
e¤ect of taking accumulated leave before retirement (Ehrenberg et al 1986), or
because of a gradual decline in enthusiasm for the job and hence an increase
in absenteeism, given that we control for major health problems through the
teacher being identied as disabled. There is no statistically signicant gender
di¤erence in the incidence of absenteeism for either primary or secondary school
teachers. Teachers from a Non English Speaking Background have absence rates
that are between 8% and 11% higher. As expected, the impact of having a regis-
tered disability on the amount of absenteeism taken is very high, 31% and 25%,
respectively, for primary and secondary teachers.
There are some interesting ndings with respect to contract status and the
incidence of absenteeism. Workers on temporary contracts take signicantly
(22%-24%) fewer days of absence than their colleagues on permanent contracts,
which may be indicative of a presenteeism e¤ect in an attempt to secure a perma-
nent contract (Ichino and Riphahn 2005). A further aspect of the contractual
arrangement for teachers is that some are asked to perform higher duties in
return for more pay. We nd that those primary and secondary teachers under-
taking such duties have around 20% to 24% less absence, which indicates that
performance-related pay may reduce shirking. For secondary school teachers we
note that absenteeism varies by subject specialism.
Turning to the locality e¤ects, the e¤ects of school size and the average qual-
ity of the pupil population are either statistically insignicant or very small.
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Some of the contextual e¤ects are slightly larger and more signicant, for in-
stance, the higher the average age of the teaching body or the higher the pro-
portion of teachers who are female in primary schools, the greater an individual
teachers absence. We nd that teachers in remote and rural schools take less
absence than teachers in urban schools. This could be related to a greater com-
mitment amongst teachers willing to take teaching posts in these localities, a
wider sense of community involvement, or simply an inadequate supply of casual
teachers, which means that teachers in non-urban areas are forced to present
themselves for work to ensure that the class is taught.8
5.2 The e¤ect of group interaction on absenteeism
Table 5 summarises our estimates of the group interaction e¤ect that are derived
from pooled OLS, panel and mover models. The dependent variable is the level
or change in individual teacher absenteeism in each quarter over two years. Ini-
tially, we estimate pooled OLS models to provide estimates of group interaction
e¤ects without addressing the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and endogene-
ity. Column 2 presents estimates of  obtained from a pooled OLS estimation
of Equation 4 where the individual xed e¤ects term is dropped. The intro-
duction of individual specic xed e¤ects (column 3) has no marked e¤ect on
the estimates. Indeed, these basic set of results suggest the presence of group
interaction e¤ects on absenteeism behaviour are not substantially changed by
8There is some support for this latter argument as casual teachers as a proportion of the
total teacher workforce is much lower in remote areas; 50% less than in urban areas in the
case of primary schools and 20% less for secondary schools
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the inclusion of controls for unobserved individual level heterogeneity.
A problem with these estimates, however, is that there is an identication
problem for the reasons discussed earlier. We therefore estimate Equation 5
for those teachers who move schools, with and without the dummy variables,
Djt. In the appendix (Table A1) we present summary information on movers
in comparison to stayers. The main di¤erences are that movers are slightly
younger, have a shorter tenure and are more likely to be on a temporary contract.
Inter-school movement may be part of a sorting process where, for instance,
teachers with higher absence propensities move to schools with higher average
absence rates. However, it was found that individuals in the highest quartile
of the absence distribution moved to schools that had a slightly lower average
absenteeism than their origin school. For movers from other quartiles there
was no discernible change in average school absenteeism between origin and
destination. Hence, there does not appear to be systematic sorting across schools
by absence propensity, at least within the 2 year time frame in which we observe
movement. However, we investigate below if this is true for di¤erent types of
movers.
Column 4 and 5 of Table 5 provide OLS estimates of the mover models. As
these models are estimated for the period of movement, they provide estimates
of the contemporaneous impact of group interaction e¤ects on individual ab-




Aijt 1 is robust at
around 0.07, regardless of the inclusion of the district dummy variables, whereas
for secondary school teachers the coe¢ cient is between 0.10 and 0.12. We can
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therefore claim that a worker takes one more day of absenteeism per quarter if
his average coworker takes 12 more days or 8 more days absenteeism per quarter
for primary school and secondary school teachers, respectively. The magnitude
of these group interaction e¤ects are lower for primary school teachers and
similar for secondary teachers when compared to those previously reported for
absenteeism in Ichino and Maggi (2000). Our results are also comparable to
those found in other more general research on group interaction e¤ects (see for
instance Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and Falk and Ichino (2003)).
5.3 Further tests
Recall that our analysis of movers may not fully mitigate the identication
problems referred to earlier. We therefore performed a series of tests, discussed
above, to try to reduce the potential bias in our estimates of the group inter-
action e¤ects. The results of test 1 lead to an increase in the magnitude of the
group interaction e¤ect to 0.110 (s.e. = 0.026) for primary school teachers and
0.234 (s.e. = 0.065) for secondary school teachers. These results suggest that
our earlier estimates are downwardly biased, although the ndings for secondary
school teachers are higher than expected. The second test proved less conclusive
insofar as the estimates were statistically insignicant, regardless of the choice of
instruments. This is due to problems in nding suitable instrumental variables
in our data. For the third test the estimated e¤ect of the mean absence rate
of arriving teachers is positive and that for departing teachers is negative, as
expected, however, the estimates are small and statistically insignicant. This
21
is not surprising as the number of movers is small relative to the number of
stayers. It is likely, however, that the e¤ect of group interaction is bigger in
small schools simply because group norms are more easily and more directly
transmitted. To test this hypothesis we re-estimated test 3 but for schools with
less than 30 teachers, and the estimated e¤ects are considerably larger, correctly
signed but statistically insignicant. These ndings are consistent with those of
Ichino and Maggi (2000).9
Up to this point we have ignored the motivation for teachers to move school.
This may impact upon our estimates of group interaction e¤ects insofar as
individuals whose absence behaviour is improving over time may move to low-
absence schools. If this occurs this would tend to overstate the relationship
between individual and group absence behaviour and lead to an upwardly biased




Aikt 1(Ichino and Maggi 2000). Our data does
not explicitly identify reasons for movement between schools. However, we
observe changes in a workers job classication level and their wage rate, which
means that we can identify those teachers who received a promotion as part
of their school move and those who did not. Individuals who move as part of
a promotion are more likely to have improving absence behaviour over time.
As a result we would expect estimates of group interaction e¤ects to be more
likely to be upwardly biased for promoted movers. We re-estimate our mover
9An additional issue is that reection problems are likely to be particularly severe in
workplaces with a smaller number of sta¤. To examine whether small schools were a¤ecting the
parameter estimates of our mover models, we re-estimated these models excluding movements
to or from small schools (5 or less teachers). This was found to not materially alter our
estimates of group interaction e¤ects.
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model separately for the promoted and non-promoted sub-groups for primary





non-promoted sub-group were approximately 0.064 (s.e. = 0.030) and 0.063
(s.e. = 0.059) for primary and secondary school teachers, respectively. The
corresponding estimates for teachers who moved schools due to a promotion
are 0.076 (s.e = 0.030) and 0.159 (s.e. = 0.068) for primary and secondary
teachers, respectively. Similar to Ichino and Maggi (2000) we nd that the
estimates of group interaction e¤ects for promoted workers are higher than
those for other movers, and in the case of secondary school teachers these are
statistically di¤erent. This suggests that the results in Table 5 may be slightly
upwardly biased, especially in the case of secondary teachers. Nonetheless,
for primary school teachers the estimates of group interaction e¤ects are still
statistically signicant.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to analyse to what extent individual teacher ab-
sence behaviour is inuenced by group behaviour. To do this we have used a
unique database of all primary and secondary teachers employed in the Queens-
land public sector over a period of one year. To address problems related to
the identication of group interaction e¤ects we focused on those teachers who
moved school during this period. Our results suggest that absenteeism is a func-
tion of observable teacher characteristics, such as disability, contract status and
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the remoteness of the school, however, group interaction e¤ects also play a sig-
nicant role in determining individual absenteeism. Our ndings suggest that
individual absenteeism will increase by one day if peer group absenteeism in-
crease by between approximately 8 and 12 days. This is interpreted as evidence
that worker shirking is inuenced by workplace absence norms.
Overall, our results support previous research which demonstrates that in-
dividual absence behaviour is related to levels of absenteeism within the work
unit (Ichino and Maggi 2000). This is particularly striking given that our data
covers a system where work policies and procedures are highly standardised.
Thus, although explicit di¤erences in an organisations policy can a¤ect the
level of absenteeism (Ehrenberg et al 1986), in this case variations in manage-
ment and personnel factors at the school level seem a more likely explanation.
It is also likely that the e¤ect of group interaction reects increased propensities
to shirk at the individual teacher level. As a result, further research would do
well to consider how absenteeism, and specically the group-interaction e¤ect,
responds to human resource practices, such as changes in management sta¤ and
the manner in which absence management policies are applied. In summary, our
results suggest that even in large bureaucratic organisations, such as state-based
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Figure 1: Distribution of Average Teachers Absent per School, 2001-2002.
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Table 1: Teacher Absence Rates, Australia and the UK
Australia 2002 UK 1999
Primary Secondary Overall Overall
Percentage time lost - All 3.12 2.87 3.15
Percentage time lost - Full-Time 3.11 2.86
Percentage time lost - Part-Time 3.12 2.87
Percentage taking absence - Full-Time 86.65 65.19
Number of Teachers 30,277 270,901
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resource Informtion (MOHRI), Bowers and McIver (2000)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, Queensland Teachers
Primary Secondary
Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Individual Absenteeism days per quarter 1.50 1.96 1.44 2.05
Average School Level Absence per quarter# 1.52 0.77 1.49 0.50
Age (years) 41.06 9.68 41.61 9.71
Tenure (years) 12.26 10.22 12.65 10.00
Male 0.18 0.38 0.40 0.49
Non English Speaking Background 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
Disability 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
Temporary Contract 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.16
Part Time 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.25
Higher Duties 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.23
School Characteristics
Proportion of Teachers Female 0.82 0.09 0.60 0.06
Average Age 40.95 3.77 41.58 2.66
Average Tenure (years) 11.90 3.70 12.33 2.72
Local Area Unemployment Rate 8.58 4.02 8.93 4.24
Rural School 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.357
Remote School 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24
Average Literacy Score (year 7) 681.94 35.23
Retention Rate 76.93 17.25
Science 0.12 0.33
Humanities 0.14 0.34
Number of Observations 15,849 9,655
Source: MOHRI.#Excludes the absenteeism level of the ith individual.
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Table 3: The Determinants of Absenteeism Amongst Primary School Teachers

















Temporary Contract -0.315* 0.781*
(0.033) (0.023)
Part Time -0.698* 0.544*
(0.024) (0.137)
Higher Duties -0.306* 0.804*
(0.089) (0.056)
Average Literacy year 7/100 0.025 1.014
(0.034) (0.024)
School Enrolment/100 0.010 1.008**
0.006 (0.003)
Proportion Teachers Female 0.239** 1.177
(0.115) (0.098)
Average Age 0.010** 1.007
0.005 (0.004)
Average Tenure (years) -0.003 0.999
0.005 (0.004)
Rural School -0.092* 0.938*
(0.029) (0.019)
Remote School -0.157* 0.885*
(0.046) (0.033)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.006 1.004*
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant 1.53
Number of Observations 126792 126792
r2=pseudo r2 0.04 0.11
Wald chi2(25) 5029.83
Log Likelihood -257301.36
*, ** indicates statistical signicance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors, clustered at individual level, in parentheses.
Quarterly controls included but not reported.
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Table 4: The Determinants of Absenteeism Amongst Secondary School Teachers

















Temporary Contract -0.352* 0.756*
(0.069) (0.046)
Part Time -0.581* 0.582*
(0.050) (0.033)
Higher Duties -0.339* 0.762*
(0.046) (0.031)
Retention Rate/10 0.003 1.002
(0.096) (0.006)
School Enrolment/100 0.005 1.004
(0.004) (0.003)
Proportion Teachers Female -0.414 0.725
(0.254) (0.133)
Average Age 0.011 1.009
(0.012) (0.009)
Average Tenure (years) -0.013 0.990
(0.011) (0.008)
Rural School -0.121** 0.909**
(0.050) (0.036)
Remote School -0.118 0.899
(0.087) (0.068)







Number of Observations 77240 77240
r2=pseudo r2 0.02 0.07
Wald chi2(27) 2746.92
Log Likelihood -158001.20
*, ** indicates statistical signicance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses.
Quarterly controls included but not reported.
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Table 5: Estimates of Group Interaction E¤ects (Dependent Variable is Days
Absent per Quarter)
Pooled Panel Movers
OLS Fixed E¤ects with District Controls without District Controls
Primary 0.102* 0.108* 0.069* 0.069*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
Secondary 0.164* 0.123* 0.122** 0.104**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.052) (0.048)
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level in the pooled
models, at the school level for panel and mover models.Controls for pooled OLS as
per Table 3 & 4. Panel Fixed E¤ects Models include time varying individual specic
characteristics (tPi). Mover models include di¤erences (t  t 1) in time varying
characteristics.
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Table A1 Comparision of Movers and Stayers
Movers Stayers
Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Individual absence over 2 years 11.55 11.67 11.75 11.09
Age 38.45 9.80 41.71 9.75
Tenure (years) 8.07 8.35 12.78 10.37
Male 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44
Non-English speaking background 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
Disability 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24
Temporary contract 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.21
Part-time contract 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.32
Higher duties 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.10
Primary Teacher 0.69 0.46 0.61 0.49
Promotion 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43
School Characteristics
Average age at school 40.58 4.42 41.38 3.42
Average tenure at school (years) 11.35 4.19 12.27 3.59
Rural school 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
Remote school 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27
Local unemployment rate 8.77 4.36 8.72 4.11
Observations 4,817 20,617
37
